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e under thbstract Introduction: Mass gatherings (MG) may provide ideal conditions for
influenza transmission. The evidence for an association between MG and influenza
transmission is reviewed to assess whether restricting MG may reduce transmission.
Methods: Major databases were searched (Pubmed, EMBASE, Scopus, CINAHL),
producing 1706 articles that were sifted by title, abstract, and full-text. A narrative
approach was adopted for data synthesis.
Results: Twenty-fourpapersmettheinclusioncriteria,coveringMGofvaryingsizesand
settings, and including 9 observational studies, 10 outbreak reports, 4 event reports, anda
quasi-experimental study. There is someevidence that certain types ofMGmaybe associ-
atedwith increased riskof influenza transmission.MGmayalso ‘‘seed’’ newstrains intoan
area, andmay instigatecommunity transmission in apandemic.RestrictingMGs, in combi-
nationwithother social distancing interventions,mayhelp reduce transmission, but itwas
notpossibletoidentifyconclusiveevidenceontheindividualeffectofMGrestrictionalone.
Evidence suggests that eventdurationandcrowdednessmaybe thekey factors thatdeter-
mine the risk of influenza transmission, and possibly the type of venue (indoor/outdoor).
Conclusion: These factors potentially represent a basis for a policy-making framework
for MG restrictions in the event of a severe pandemic.
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access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
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It is well established that influenza is transmitted
from person to person through close contact with
an infected, symptomatic individual. The exact
mechanisms by which transmission occurs are still
unclear, but is believed to involve multiple routes,
including respiratory droplets and direct/indirect
contact [1] with secretions or fomites. Aerosol
transmission may also occur, but controversy sur-
rounds this [2] and some further evidence of aero-
sol transmission has recently been put forward [3].
This is an important issue as the mechanism of
transmission is always a key factor in infection con-
trol planning.
While uncertainty persists regarding aerosols,
droplet and contact transmission remain largely re-
garded as the most important and likely routes.
Transmission through these routes clearly requires
physical nearness to infected persons, via either di-
rect touch or the propulsion of large droplets
across a relatively short distance. This requirementmakes the consideration of mass gatherings a cru-
cial issue.
Whilst there is not a ‘‘standard’’ definition of
what constitutes a mass gathering, there is an
understanding that these are events that involve
large numbers of people (suggested minimum of
1000 people) [4–6] congregating in finite geograph-
ical areas to share an event or experience. Individ-
uals can be in very close proximity for variable
periods of time and, if the event is over a number
of days, may even share over-crowded and/or tem-
porary accommodation.
Therefore for those infectious diseases such as
influenza, where close contact is the main determi-
nant of transmission, it appears self-evident that
mass gathering events could lead to the rapid
transmission of a new causative agent.
In the event of an influenza pandemic, minimiz-
ing transmission of influenza has been a priority for
public health action. A variety of non-pharmaceuti-
cal public health interventions to reduce close con-
tact between infected and susceptible individuals,
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susceptible people such as self-isolation of pa-
tients, respiratory etiquette and hand washing
have been advocated. Banning or restricting mass
gatherings has been seen as a logical extension of
this policy, however, it is a particular concern of
policy makers that the scientific evidence upon
which to base guidance for mass gatherings is lack-
ing. This is particularly important given the need to
weigh any potential benefits against the economic
and social disruption that banning or restricting
mass gatherings could have on society.
There have been other systematic reviews
undertaken in recent years on the broader subject
of non-pharmaceutical interventions aimed at
reducing transmission of respiratory viral infections
[7,8]. These reviews considered a range of such
interventions, and they explicitly recognized that
there is a paucity of primary evidence regarding
restriction of mass gatherings (and other ‘‘social
distancing’’ measures); thus they did not primarily
focus on this specific area.
The aim of this review, therefore, was to at-
tempt to reduce this evidence gap by assessing
the available evidence base relating to the utility
of restrictions on mass gatherings during an influ-
enza pandemic. This is an important policy area
not only because of the impact such restrictions
could have on public confidence and morale, but
also because of the economic and liability issues
that such action might generate. The findings of
the review may be able to help inform policy state-
ments on the effectiveness of mass gathering
restriction interventions that may be deployed to
help reduce influenza virus spread during a
pandemic.
2. Methods
The study protocol was largely based on the Univer-
sity of Yorks Centre for Reviews and Dissemination
guidance for undertaking reviews in healthcare [9].
Work commenced in mid-July 2010 and the main
part of it was completed in mid-October 2010. Fur-
ther work was carried out in June 2011 to bring the
literature coverage up to date.
The following specific questions were developed
to capture the objectives of the review:
• Is there an association between mass gatherings and
influenza outbreaks or spread?
• Are there any particular characteristics (such as size
or duration) of mass gatherings that influence trans-
mission of influenza?
• Does the restriction of mass gatherings reduce the
spread of influenza within the community (compared
with no restriction or with other interventions)?2.1. Inclusion criteria
The following types of studies were included in the
review:
• Randomized controlled trial
• Quasi-experimental study
– Non-randomized controlled study
– Before-and-after study
• Observational study
– Cohort study
– Case-control study
• Outbreak reports
– Outbreak/cluster reports
– Historical archival outbreak analyses
• Surveillance reports
– Major event infection surveillance reports
The list above is largely in hierarchical order of
study design quality [9], but with the addition of
outbreak and surveillance reports, not traditionally
included in such lists, important to the topic of this
review. To cover the other ‘‘non-standard’’ study
design encountered, the term ‘‘quasi-experimen-
tal’’ is employed to describe controlled but non-
randomized studies [10,11].
Only studies published in English were included.
Relevant systematic and narrative reviews and
operational description papers were utilized for
useful background information. The reference lists
of the systematic reviews were scanned to identify
potentially relevant primary studies that could be
considered for inclusion. Case reports, mathemati-
cal modelling and human/non-human experimental
laboratory studies were excluded from the review.
Outcome measures included laboratory-con-
firmed influenza infection (i.e., documented by
virus isolation, molecular testing such as polymer-
ase chain reaction, and serological studies) and
clinical influenza-like illness as defined by the
investigators, whilst recognizing that this is less
specific.
2.2. Search strategy
The search strategy focused on primary studies tak-
ing into account the issues detailed above. The
term influenza rather than pandemic influenza
was used to reflect the entire spectrum of
influenza for which guidance would be relevant.
The transmission of other respiratory viruses was
also included because of the similarity of transmis-
sion and therefore the potential applicability of
any results to influenza.
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ther discussions and consultation on the work plan
and search strategy. The term mass gathering on its
own proved inadequate as a search term as there is
no clearly accepted definition of what constitutes a
mass gathering. Therefore, a range of additional
terms were used, such as public gatherings, social
gatherings, large crowds, mass events, festivals,
Olympics, Hajj, championship, and others listed
in Table 1. Transit settings such as long-distance
flights and cruise ships were not included, as it
was decided that these settings would fit better
in a separate review of evidence for influenza
transmission through transport. The final search
with revised terms and refined using the
‘‘advanced search’’ tool on PubMed was carried
out as described in Table 1, with no time periodTable 1 Details of PubMed database search.
#41 Search #22) AND #40)
#40 Search #23) OR #24) OR #25) OR #26) OR #27) OR #2
OR #35) OR #36) OR #37) OR #38) OR #39)
#39 Search ‘‘world cup’’
#38 Search games
#37 Search festival
#36 Search championships
#35 Search Hajj
#34 Search olympics
#33 Search ‘‘big event’’
#32 Search ‘‘mass event’’
#31 Search ‘‘large event’’
#30 Search crowd
#29 Search ‘‘large crowd’’
#28 Search ‘‘public event’’
#27 Search ‘‘social event’’
#26 Search ‘‘social gathering’’
#25 Search distancing
#24 Search ‘‘public gathering’’
#23 Search ‘‘mass gathering’’
#22 Search #1) OR #2) OR #4) OR #5) OR #7) OR #8) OR #
OR #19) OR #20) OR #21)
#21 Search ‘‘respiratory syncytial virus’’
#20 Search ‘‘parainfluenza virus’’
#19 Search ‘‘ILI’’
#18 Search ‘‘flu like’’
#17 Search flu-like
#16 Search tuberculosis
#15 Search ‘‘acute respiratory tract infection’’
#14 Search ‘‘acute respiratory infection*’’
#12 Search sars
#11 Search ‘‘severe acute respiratory syndrome’’
#8 Search coronavirus*
#7 Search adenovirus*
#5 Search rhinovirus*
#4 Search ‘‘common cold’’
#2 Search flu
#1 Search influenza*restrictions. The initial searches included the liter-
ature up till July 2010. A further search was con-
ducted on 31 May 2011 to bring the literature
coverage up to date as part of an editorial process.
In addition, secondary searches were also ini-
tially carried out in the following databases: Sco-
pus, Excerpta Medica Database (EMBASE), and the
Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Lit-
erature (CINAHL). These are described in Table 2.
2.3. Other sources
In addition to the search results, the reference lists
of papers identified from the search were scanned
for other potentially relevant studies. Efforts were
also made to identify studies other than those pub-
lished in the peer-reviewed literature; the authors8) OR #29) OR #30) OR #31) OR #32) OR #33) OR #34)
11) OR #12) OR #14) OR #15) OR #16) OR #17) OR #18)
Table 2 Searches of additional databases.
Database Outcome
SCOPUS 16 Hits; 2 excluded as had been found on
PubMed. The remaining 14 were added to
the list of titles considered for review
Excerpta medica database (EMBASE) 27 Hits; 24 were excluded as had been
found on PubMed. The remaining 3 were
added to the list of titles considered for
review
The cumulative index to nursing and allied health literature (CINAHL) 6 Hits; 5 were excluded as had been found
on PubMed, The last one was also excluded
as had been found on EMBASE
Search terms: flu or influenza or ‘‘respiratory infection’’ or flu-like or ‘‘respiratory viruses’’ AND ‘‘mass gatherings’’ or crowd or
‘‘major event’’ or ‘‘large crowd’’ or ‘‘large event’’ or ‘‘big event’’ or ‘‘mass event.’’
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identify additional published articles or other doc-
uments of relevance.
2.4. Study selection and data extraction
Study selection was conducted in stages. At all
stages, scanning and reviews were done indepen-
dently by the authors, who then harmonized their
selections. Papers identified by the searches were
scanned and some excluded on the basis of the ti-
tle for relevance to the review. The abstracts of
the remaining papers were then reviewed to iden-
tify studies that appeared to meet the inclusion cri-
teria. The full text versions of all these articles
were then sought and read in full. For papers that
had relevant titles but no abstracts, the full text
articles were also obtained, scanned for relevance,
and if relevant they were read in full. In addition,
some papers that did not meet the inclusion crite-
ria (e.g. operational descriptions of interventions,
commentaries, or editorial reviews of influenza
transmission or pandemic influenza) were selected
to provide relevant background or supplemental
information.
Data from the selected full text papers were ex-
tracted using a pre-designed form. Data elements
included publication information, study character-
istics, participant characteristics, the intervention
(if any) and setting, outcome and results. The data
extracted were used to determine the eligibility of
each paper for inclusion in the review. This process
resulted in a final selection of eligible articles that
were then included in the review.
2.5. Temporal and situational context of the
review
The main body of this work was undertaken in 2010
by the UK Health Protection Agency as part of acomprehensive influenza scientific evidence review
informing the UK National Pandemic Influenza
Strategy. Within this context, the work was carried
out within a very tight three-month timeframe and
with significantly limited resources. As a result,
some of the most comprehensive steps required
of a full systematic review could not be realisti-
cally accommodated. Therefore, a modified pro-
cess was adopted in conducting this ‘‘rapid
evidence assessment’’ rather than a full, formal
systematic review. Rapid evidence assessments
are well recognized as a pragmatic approach to in-
clude all the major elements of a full systematic
review, ensuring an outcome that is as comprehen-
sive as possible while accepting limited compro-
mises in order to meet stipulated deadlines for
feeding into the policy process [9].
Due to the time constraints, it was not practical
to pursue time-intensive contacts with authors or
to seek translations for non-English articles, which
were therefore excluded. Articles lacking abstracts
were largely excluded, and there was a limited
search for unpublished studies. However, to try to
mitigate these limitations, full draft versions of
the review were submitted to national experts at
the UK Health Protection Agency and the Scientific
Pandemic Influenza committee of the UK Depart-
ment of Health, seeking their comments and advice
on any papers or documents that may have been
omitted. Some further work was carried out in May
to June 2011 to update the literature.
2.6. Quality assessment
At the outset, a strategy was developed to assess
the quality of eligible studies using the Critical Ap-
praisal Skills Programme (CASP) tools as appropri-
ate for each type of study [12]. However, after
completion of the literature search, it was clear
that the types of studies and the study design types
38 D.A. Ishola, N. Phinidentified were not suitable for assessment by the
CASP tools. Similarly for the outbreak reports
included in the review, no suitable existing frame-
work could be readily identified for quality assess-
ment. The ORION tool was not strictly applicable as
it is specific to outbreaks of nosocomial infection
[13,14]. Therefore, a modified approach was
adopted, whereby each paper was categorized as
having low risk, some risk, or high risk for bias with
respect to the relevant review question addressed
by that study. The grading was assessed based on
the presence of significant methodological limita-
tions. A high risk of bias was attributed to papers
with at least three significant methodological is-
sues as identified by the review authors, while pa-
pers with at least two issues were classified as
having some risk. This approach was adapted from
a system previously used by Jefferson et al. [7].
The quality of the review itself was tested
against checklists based on the MOOSE [15] and
PRISMA [16,17] standards. Within the restrictions
of the time constraints already described, key gaps
and issues identified by the checklists were ad-
dressed as appropriate and/or acknowledged in
Sections 2.5 (explaining the review context includ-
ing time constraints) and 4.4 (recognizing the study
limitations).
2.7. Data synthesis
The data synthesis was restricted to a narrative ap-
proach that included an analysis of the relation-
ships within and between studies and an overall
assessment of the robustness of the evidence and
limitations of both the studies and the evidence re-
view [9]. In addition, the synthesis considered the
implications for policy and guidance development
as well as future research.
3. Results
The search identified a total of 1706 papers after
accounting for overlaps between the different dat-
abases. These were reviewed on the basis of title
for relevance to the review (Fig. 1), and on this ba-
sis 1593 papers were excluded. Abstracts for the
remaining 113 papers were reviewed and a further
54 were eliminated.
Full copies of the remaining 59 papers plus 6 pa-
pers identified from scanning the reference lists of
review papers, and 3 papers retrieved from the
authors hardcopy files, were reviewed and summa-
rized. Table 3 provides a classification of the 68 pa-
pers that were read in full text.
After full text review, 24 papers were classified
as meeting the inclusion criteria. These included aquasi-experimental study (a non-randomized trial)
[18], nine observational studies [19–27], seven
outbreak reports [28–34], three historical out-
break archive analyses [35–37], and four event sur-
veillance reports [38–41]. Details for each of these
studies are summarized in Table 4. The 44 papers
that were read but not included in the review are
listed in Table 5.
3.1. Quasi-experimental study
One quasi-experimental study by Qureshi et al. [18]
attempted to investigate the incidence of vaccine
preventable influenza-like illness among Pakistani
pilgrims to the Hajj religious gathering in 1999.
The Hajj is an annual religious event that takes
place over a number of days in a very small geo-
graphic area of Saudi Arabia usually involving 2 to
3 million pilgrims from all over the world. Accom-
modation is at a premium during this event and
many pilgrims stay in tents specifically erected
for the event and that are often over-crowded.
Although primarily a vaccine efficacy study, the
rates of influenza-like illness reported in vacci-
nated pilgrims were 36% compared with 62% in
non-vaccinated pilgrims. However, these results
were based on clinical endpoints without microbio-
logic confirmation; a non-randomized design was
used, and the study was not designed to address
the primary question of this review.3.2. Observational studies
Nine observational studies estimated the risk of
acute respiratory illness and/or influenza-like ill-
ness associated with the Hajj pilgrimage by
attempting to measure its occurrence in pilgrims.
Four [23–25,27] of these studies confirmed the
cause of illness by laboratory testing, while the
other five relied on specified symptom complexes
as surrogate indicators.
Among the nine observational studies were four
cross-sectional studies. Balkhy and colleagues [24]
tested 500 Hajj pilgrims in 2003 who presented
with symptoms of upper respiratory tract infection
in the second week of the event; 30 (6%) of the 500
pilgrims tested positive for influenza. Rashid et al.
[23] assessed the burden of laboratory-confirmed
influenza and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV)
infections in symptomatic British Hajj pilgrims in
the 2005 event. Of 202 symptomatic pilgrims who
underwent nasal swab testing, 28 (about 14%) had
confirmed influenza (mostly A type), while only 9
(4%) had RSV infection. In the 2006 Hajj, the same
investigators [27] found comparable levels of labo-
ratory confirmed influenza (10–11%) in both UK and
Full papers sought for 
review
n=68
Excluded on basis
of title
n= 1593
Excluded on basis of 
abstract
n=54
Identified by scanning
reference lists of 
review papers
n=6
Identified by hand-
search of hardcopy 
files
n=3
Excluded for not meeting 
inclusion criteria
n=44 
 22 reviews or  
commentaries
22 otherPapers meeting inclusion 
criteria
n=24
Papers included in the 
systematic review 
n=24
9 observational studies
7 outbreak reports
3 historical outbreak 
analyses
4 event surveillance 
reports
1 quasi-experimental 
study
Excluded for quality 
n = 0
Titles and abstracts
identified and screened
n=1706
Figure 1 Diagram of search strategy results and article selection.
Table 3 Classification of 68 papers read in full, by type of paper.
Type Total number of papers Number included in the review
Quasi-experimental study (non-randomized trial) 2 1
Observational study 13 9
Outbreak report 8 7
Historical outbreak archival data study 7 3
Event surveillance report 7 4
Systematic review 3 0
Narrative review 6 0
Editorial/commentary/statement/opinion 13 0
Background/operational/supplemental information 9 0
Total 68 24
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tion contrasted with the findings in the cross-sec-
tional study by Deris et al. [20] who based their
assessment on syndromic influenza-like illness
rather than laboratory-confirmed infection. They
found an influenza-like illness prevalence of 40%in Malaysian pilgrims who had just completed the
Hajj.
The other five observational studies were simi-
larly designed, involving groups of intending Hajj
pilgrims who were recruited in their home regions
or countries prior to the event, and then re-assessed
Table 4 Synopsis of studies included in the final review.
Investigator
(Reference
number)
Study design and participants Reported results Comments
(A) Quasi-experimental study
Qureshi et al.
[18]
Controlled, non-randomized, open-
label (non-blinded) influenza
vaccine trial. Vaxigrip (Aventis –
Pasteur) was used as a ‘‘vaccine
probe’’ to investigate the
incidence of vaccine-preventable
influenza-like illness (ILI) among
Pakistani pilgrims to the Hajj
religious gathering in 1999. There
were 2070 participants spread
across five groups of pilgrims (1120
vaccine group; 950 control group).
Participants followed up to record
ILI symptoms using daily health
status report forms and clinic
report forms for those referred to
local hospitals during Hajj
ILI attack rate: Vaccine group
36%; control 62%
Vaccine efficacy 38%
Vaccine preventable ILI
incidence of 22/100 control
participants
Limitations include:
- The non-randomized design.
- Underpowered as recruit-
ment fell slightly short of
estimated sample size.
- Difficult presentation style;
lack of flow-chart to clearly
show the progression of par-
ticipants through the trial
process
(B) Observational studies
Deris et al.
[20]
A relatively small (n = 387) cross-
sectional study of Malaysian
pilgrims who had just completed
the Hajj. Participants were
recruited at the post-Hajj transit
center for returning pilgrims.
Occurrence of respiratory
symptoms was elicited by
questionnaire
Almost all participants had at
least one respiratory symptom
(cough 91.5%). The prevalence
of ILI was 40.1%, even though
72% received influenza
vaccination before the trip
Limitations include:
- Small study – uncertain how
representative of the Malay-
sian pilgrims.
- Participant recruitment site
was not ideal.
- Influenza diagnosis was
subjective.
- There was no unexposed
suitable control group for
prevalence comparison.
- It is unclear whether the
study attempted to measure
point prevalence of ILI at
the time of study, or ILI inci-
dence during the Hajj period
Rashid et al.
[27]
A cross-sectional comparison of
viral respiratory infections
between UK and Saudi pilgrims at
Hajj 2006. Pilgrims with symptoms
of URTI were recruited from a
dedicated UK pilgrims walk-in
clinic service at the event; and a
Saudi clinic which mainly served
Saudi pilgrims but was open to
everyone
A total of 260 pilgrims were
recruited, having presented with
URTI several days after the start of
Hajj (infection presumed acquired
during the event). They completed
questionnaires, and provided nasal
swabs for testing by both on-site
rapid diagnostic screening (to guide
antiviral therapy) and later analysis
by real-time RT-PCR
UK pilgrims: n = 150. 38 (25%)
had at least one virus; 17 (11%)
had influenza. Saudi pilgrims:
n = 110. 14 (13%) had at least 1
virus; 11 (10%) had influenza.
There were similar influenza
proportions between the two,
despite differences in
vaccination rates. A risk-group
analysis was done to compare
those ‘‘at-risk’’ for influenza
with those who were not
Laboratory confirmation was
a strength of the study
Limitations include:
- The sample size was rather
small for comparing the
two populations, especially
as the Saudi Hajj population
was apparently much larger
than the UK delegation.
- Lack of non-exposed (non-
Hajj) control groups
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Balkhy et al.
[24]
A cross-sectional study of pilgrims
from different parts of the world
attending the Hajj 2003 event
Participants were pilgrims or
event workers presenting at
dedicated walk-in clinics with
URTI on days 10, 11 and 12 of the
Hajj (making it likely that
infection was acquired during the
event)
500 URTI patients who completed
questionnaires and had throat
swabs were included. 52.8% were
males and most participants were
in the 20–40 year age group. Swab
samples were subjected to viral
studies to detect a range of
respiratory viruses (inoculation
into designated cell lines,
followed by immunofluorescence
studies)
54 (10.8%) of the 500 URTI
patients tested positive for at
least one virus, and a number
had multiple infections.
Influenza was the most
common virus, found in 30
individuals (representing 6%
of the total 500 URTI
patients)
By simple extrapolation of
these findings to the total
event population of
approximately 2 million, it
was estimated that at least
400,000 pilgrims would
develop URTI, of which
24,000 would have influenza
A notable strength of the
study was that influenza
infection was confirmed by
viral studies
Limitations include:
- No data on the local prevail-
ing influenza activity.
- Selection by convenience
sampling rather than a dis-
cernible strategy; probably
not representative of the
event population. It is diffi-
cult to extrapolate based
on these data,
- Any extrapolation to the
whole event population
should require complex
modelling to account for a
variety of factors
Rashid et al.
[23]
A cross-sectional study
estimating the incidence of
laboratory-confirmed influenza
and RSV infection in British Hajj
2005 pilgrims who developed
URTI symptoms. The study also
compared a rapid point-of-care
diagnostic technique with
definitive PCR testing
Participants were recruited (a)
among pilgrims presenting at
designated British Hajj clinics
with URTI symptoms; and (b) by
visiting several groups of pilgrims
in their camps and inviting those
with symptoms to participate.
Symptoms were documented by
questionnaire and clinical
examination; and nasal swabs
taken
202 URTI symptomatic persons
were tested; 28 (14%) had PCR-
confirmed influenza (20 with
AH3 strain, 7 with B strain, and
1 with AH1). All presented
4 days or more after reaching
the Hajj, suggesting infection
during the event. Influenza
vaccination was not
significantly protective. Nine
other persons had RSV
infection. There were no
complications found on follow-
up checks 12 weeks after the
Hajj
The use of laboratory
confirmation was a strength
of the study
Limitations include:
- Sampling was restricted to
only a small proportion of
pilgrims; may not be repre-
sentative of the 25,000 Brit-
ish Hajj pilgrims for that
year.
- Lack of a suitable (non-Hajj
attending) control group to
compare influenzaoccurrence
Choudhry
et al. [19]
Prospective cohort study of ARI
incidence among Riyadh
residents attending the 2002 Hajj
in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Pre-Hajj
questionnaire administered at
recruitment at travel vaccine
clinics. Post-Hajj telephone
interviews were used to collect
data on ARI incidence
Of 1027 participants, 39.8%
developed ARI during or within
two weeks of Hajj. Older
subjects and those with
underlying disease (diabetes)
were more at risk. Stay at Hajj
area for 5 days or more was
associated with increased risk
of ARI
Limitations include:
- Lack of control group to
compare ARI in people not
exposed to Hajj event.
- Lack of information on the
background influenza or ILI
activity in Saudi Arabia at
the time
(continued on next page)
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Gautret et al.
[26]
An observational study of French
pilgrims in the 2009 Hajj. The study
primarily focused on the influence
of preventive measures on the
occurrence of influenza in these
pilgrims
405 intending French pilgrims were
recruited from pre-Hajj mandatory
meningococcal vaccination clinics;
247 people who completed a post-
Hajj telephone questionnaire were
included in the study. The mean
age was 58 years and the
male:female ratio was 1:1. The use
of a range of preventive measures
was recorded
22 participants (8% of 247)
had ILI, defined as a triad of
cough, sore throat and
fever. Cough was the most
common respiratory
symptom found (48.5% of
participants)
The use of preventive
measures including
vaccination and face masks
did not significantly reduce
symptoms
Limitations include:
- Dependence on clinical out-
comes rather than labora-
tory confirmation of
influenza.
- No information on the 131
people (33% of initial
recruitment)
El Bashir
et al. [25]
Influenza serological study of a
cohort of UK pilgrims attending the
2003 Hajj. Participants were
recruited among worshippers at a
single mosque in East London who
intended to attend the Hajj.
Venous blood samples and
questionnaires were completed
before and within 2–3 weeks after
the Hajj; 115 participants were
enrolled
Haemagglutination inhibition tests
were used for laboratory
assessment, with influenza
diagnosis based on seroconversion
defined as at least fourfold
antibody titre rise
44 (38%) of the pilgrims
developed influenza (based
on seroconversion). A total
of 93 (81%) had symptoms of
respiratory infection.
Vaccination did not seem to
be significantly protective
A small but useful study that
was strengthened by
laboratory testing for
influenza
Limitations include:
- The analysis would have
been strengthened by having
a non-exposed (non-Hajj)
control group.
- Recruitment from a single
London mosque means that
the sample is unlikely to
be representative of UK
pilgrims
Gautret et al.
[22]
Prospective cohort study of French
pilgrims attending 2006 Hajj,
assessing influence of statin on
febrile cough incidence; 580
subjects were recruited at pre-
travel clinic facility; 10.3% were
taking statin for hypercholesterol;
34.3% had influenza vaccine; 43%
had an underlying chronic disease.
A post-Hajj questionnaire was used
to collect data on health problems
faced during the trip
447 participants responded.
High attack rate of cough
episodes (60.6% overall). In
all, 13.9% had both cough
and fever. Neither influenza
vaccine nor statin use were
protective
Limitations include:
- Lack of control group to
compare ARI in people not
exposed to Hajj event.
- Lack of information on the
background influenza or ILI
activity.
- Actual Hajj dates not given,
reducing the utility of the
provided ‘‘epidemic curve’’
of fever and cough
Gautret,
et al. [21]
Prospective cohort study of travel-
associated health problems in
French pilgrims attending 2007
Hajj. 545 subjects were recruited
at pre-travel clinic facility. All had
influenza vaccine. A post-Hajj
questionnaire was used to collect
data on health problems faced
during the trip
462 participants responded.
58.9% had at least one
health problem; 2.8% were
hospitalized. Cough was the
commonest symptom
overall (51%) – about a fifth
of these (overall 9%) had
fever and cough; the risk of
this increased with age
Limitations:
- A fairly small number of
subjects.
- All recruited from a single
clinic.
- Lack of a control group to
compare ARI in people not
exposed to Hajj event
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(C) Outbreak reports
Pang et al.
[32]
An overview report of the 2003
SARS outbreak in Beijing, China,
with 2521 probable cases reported
over a 3-month period from March
to May, and 7.6% case fatality rate
The authors also reported the
control measures taken by health
authorities against the outbreak.
They analysed the timeline of
response measures against the
epidemiological progression of the
outbreak, attempting to identify
which control measures were the
most effective
A range of medical, physical
and social control measures
were taken at different time
points
Among these was the closure of
public entertainment sites,
such as theatres and indoor
sports facilities. Authors
concluded that control of the
outbreak was achieved through
a combination of factors
As mass gatherings
restriction was only part of a
battery of interventions, it
is hard to make out the
individual effect of
restrictions
Saenz et al.
[33]
Influenza outbreak report from a
medical congress held in Teheran
on September 7–15, 1968.
Background: The A2/Hong Kong/68
virus caused a series of outbreaks
across several Asian countries in
1968, but had not been found in
Teheran prior to this congress
Description: during the congress,
many participants developed
symptoms and one of them started
an investigation. Questionnaires
were later sent to all 1036
participants from 82 countries on
all continents. 844 responded
304 of 844 respondents fulfilled
criteria for influenza, with a
final attack rate of 36%. Illness
was mostly mild; more marked
and prolonged in those aged
>55 years; 50 respondents
returned to their home
countries with fever, of which
36% were believed to have
spread infection to contacts,
but no large local foci
developed
This was a well-reported
outbreak. Surprisingly,
serological test results were
not reported even though
samples were said to have
been taken. Also,
information on the numbers
of cases in contacts of
participants was not
provided
Gutierrez
et al. [30]
Influenza outbreak report at the
‘‘Rock Werchter’’ musical festival
in Belgium, July 2–5, 2009, during
the 2009 A(H1N1) pandemic. The
event involved 113,000 participants
30 event-linked ILI cases, with
12 confirmed A(H1N1). There
were no hospital admissions;
mean age 23 (range 18–45)
years. The index case was
identified as an Israeli
participant who arrived in
Belgium via London, became ill
on July 3 (day after arrival) and
presented to festival clinic on
July 5. The median generation
interval for secondary cases was
estimated to be 4 (range 3–7)
days. Later, two further event-
linked confirmed cases were
found in the Netherlands and
Luxembourg. The outbreak
prompted a national shift to a
mitigation strategy in Belgium
as it was assessed that
community transmission had
started
There was likely under-
reporting as there was no
active case-finding at the
festival site. However,
there was considerable
national mass media and
Internet publicity about the
cases
(continued on next page)
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Loncarevic
et al. [31]
Influenza outbreak reports at two
large events held in Serbia in July
2009, during the 2009 pandemic.
Prior to the events, 20 cases of
H1N1 influenza had been noted.
The events were: (i) The 25th
Universiade – World University
Games, July 1–12, involving 8600
athletes, 15,000 volunteers and
staff, and 500,000 spectators; on
53 sites in 9 locations; (ii) the
10th EXIT music festival, July 9–
12; involving 190,000 visitors to an
open-air, multi-stage festival.
There was an enhanced daily
surveillance system for both
events
(i) Universiade: 7 confirmed
cases (4 believed linked to the
Games). (ii) EXIT festival: 62
confirmed cases (47 linked to
event); mostly aged 16–
30 years, and all mild. A further
32 probable cases linked to the
festival occurred after it ended,
but not confirmed due to a
change in testing policy. There
were no complications or
deaths
Cases may have been under-
reported due to
asymptomatic cases or non-
presenters
Botelho-
Nevers et al.
[29]
Influenza cluster and unusual case
report, linked with the Sziget rock
festival in Budapest, August 11–18
2009. The event involved 390,000
participants. This was during the
2009 A(H1N1) pandemic, thus a
dedicated flu medical tent was set
up and the local hospital placed on
stand-by
14 people were hospitalized
(3.6/100,000); 8 were
confirmed PCR positive for
A(H1N1) (57.1%). Background
activity at the time in Hungary
was ILI 7.8/100,000; and across
Europe (ECDC) it was 34.9/
100,000 with 15.3% A(H1N1)
positivity
Surveillance through
EuroTravNet revealed no other
cases in participants returning
to other European nations
The unusual case was a 23-
year-old French male
participant who had dual
infection with A(H1N1) and
varicella zoster virus. He was
hospitalized in France and had
a good outcome
ILI rates were lower at the
festival than the national
and continental rates;
however the A(H1N1)
positivity was much higher
than the European
population rate; together
possibly suggesting that
many mild cases may not
have presented in clinic
Zepeda-Lopez
et al. [34]
An analysis of the 2009 A(H1N1)
outbreak in Mexico. The paper
described the clinical features
seen in a series of confirmed
cases
Different epidemiological
resources were used to map the
spread of the virus throughout
the country, including the
Mexican SINAVE surveillance
system and official reports from
the Mexican Secretariat of
Health
202 of 751 suspected cases were
confirmed infected with the
novel 2009 pandemic A(H1N1)
virus
Two likely key contributory
factors to influenza spread
were noted: (i) high
population density, and (ii) a
mass gathering involving over
2 million people, held in
Iztapalapa, Mexico City at an
early stage of the outbreak
An innovative study using
various sources of
information to determine
the temporal-spatial
dynamics of influenza
transmission
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Blyth et al.
[28]
Report of influenza outbreak during
the World Youth Day events in
Sydney, July 15–20, 2008. This was
a time of low local seasonal
influenza activity, but near the
onset of Australian influenza
season. The largest of the series of
religious events was a Papal Mass
with a crowd of 400,000. The first
influenza case was noted on July 16
and flu clinics were rapidly set up
and symptomatic people
encouraged to attend. They had
paired nose and throat swabs taken
and detailed virological serotyping
carried out
100 of 227 symptomatic
people who voluntarily
attended clinics had
laboratory-confirmed
influenza (a range of A and B
types). Local influenza
activity increased in the
weeks following the event,
with evidence of introduction
of novel influenza viruses
The outbreak response
was well-organized,
resourced and reported.
Data collection was not
standardized as numerous
clinicians manned the
rapidly set-up clinics. The
true extent of the
outbreak is unknown.
Also, as the event was
held near the onset of the
usual Australian influenza
season, the post-event
increase in flu activity
may have occurred
regardless
(D) Historical outbreak studies
Markel et al.
[37]
Historical archival outbreak
analysis research
Setting: 1918–1919 influenza
pandemic. This study examined
detailed records of the period
September 8, 1918 to February
22, 1919, analysing the public
health responses of American
cities to the pandemic; 43
American cities (all with a
population at the time exceeding
100,000) and for which the most
extensive records of Public
Health interventions could be
found, were studied. The sources
of information included the
period ‘‘Weekly Health Index’’ of
the U.S. Census Bureau, official
public health reports, media
archives, and municipal records
Three main categories of non-
phamaceutical interventions
(NPI) were applied: (a) school
closures; (b) isolation and
quarantine; and (c) public
gathering bans (which included
closing salons, sports events,
entertainment venues, and
some indoor gatherings). Most
cities implemented a
combination of these
interventions, most commonly
combining public gathering
bans and school closures
A total of 143,000 excess
pneumonia and influenza
deaths occurred in the 43
cities during the period
studied. In general, early and
sustained NPI implementation
was significantly beneficial.
Cities with earlier NPI reached
peak mortality later and had
lower peak and total
mortality. Sustained and
lengthier NPI implementation
was associated with lower
excess mortality
The major strength of the
study was to link archived
data with modern
techniques to produce
research that is useful at
this time
The limitations are similar
to those of Hatchett
et al.[36] below
(continued on next page)
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Hatchett
et al. [36]
Historical archival outbreak
analysis research
Setting: 1918 influenza
pandemic. This study examined
detailed records of the period
September 8 to December 28,
1918, focusing on the public
health responses of American
cities to the pandemic; 17
American cities for which
complete records of Public
Health interventions could be
found, were studied. The sources
of information included
newspaper archives, municipal
records, and consultations with
current officials
19 Categories of NPIs were
identified. The measures of
epidemic outcome included the
peak death rate, and a
‘‘normalized’’ peak that was
standardized to facilitate inter-
city comparison. Among the
findings were that:
- Aggressive early NPI was associ-
ated with lower peak excess
mortality.
- Early implementation of school,
church, and theatre closures
were individually associated
with lower normalized peak
excess weekly deaths
A real strength of the study
is that it combines archived
data with modern
techniques to produce
potentially very valuable
data. This allows an
evaluation of an
experimental situation that
is very difficult to simulate
as a contemporary
intervention
study.Limitations include:
- The difficulties and draw-
backs of historical record
retrieval.
- Heterogeneous definitions of
‘‘public gatherings’’.
- Doubts regarding applicabil-
ity of the findings to current
practice as society has chan-
ged dramatically since that
time
Aimone [35] A historical examination of the
response of New York City (NYC)
authorities to the 1918 pandemic
influenza
NYC took a number of public
health actions, particularly to
reduce rush-hour crowding.
There were no formal closures
of theatres or schools. Yet,
the excess death rate due to
pandemic in NYC was
comparable or lower than in
some other major U.S. cities
(E) Event surveillance reports
Gundlapalli
et al. [38]
Prospective influenza surveillance
report from the Winter Olympiad,
February and March 2002.
Components of the surveillance
program included: screening of
athletes and non-athletes with
respiratory symptoms; daily
review of viral testing and
community public health reports;
and case treatment and contact
prophylaxis
2635 medical visits reported
during the Games; 12% with
respiratory symptoms. Three
main clusters of ILI: (a) 13-man
team of security staff with 3
confirmed cases; (b) a 12-
member national team with 2
confirmed; (c) 8 participants of
the same sport, with 5
confirmed. Overall, 188 people
were screened for influenza; 36
were positive (28 type A and 8
type B). Syndromic definition of
ILI (fever and cough or sore
throat) was not highly
predictive of confirmed
influenza (sensitivity 67% and
specificity 78%)
This was a well-organized
systematic prospective
influenza surveillance
program, described by the
authors as the first of its
type at a large Games
event Limitations include:
- No indication of total num-
bers of people at the event
or in the city
- No indication of the back-
ground ILI activity in the city
or country; or whether this
was during the local winter
influenza season
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Demicheli
et al. [41]
Prospective influenza surveillance
report from the Winter Olympics in
Torino, Italy, February and March
2006. Components of the
surveillance program included:
statutory notification of infectious
diseases, laboratory-based
surveillance of invasive diseases,
sentinel surveillance of influenza-
like illness, syndromic surveillance,
and toxic exposure surveillance
GP-based daily reporting of
ILI showed that there was no
increased ILI activity
throughout the period. In
fact, ILI activity was less
than for the corresponding
period of the previous year
Well-organized systematic
prospective influenza
surveillance program
The report was quite brief
and rather short on details
Lim et al. [39] Influenza surveillance report during
the disease containment phase of
the 2009 A(H1N1) pandemic. More
than 600 confirmed cases had
occurred in Singapore prior to the
Games
Asian Youth Games in Singapore,
June 29 to July 7, 2009 (football
preliminaries started on June 20).
The Games involved 9 sports at 10
venues; 1210 athletes; and 810
officials all from 43 different
countries
66 suspected cases
identified at the Games
medical facility; 6
confirmed and isolated in
hospital. By contact tracing,
42 persons were
quarantined. There was no
evidence of A(H1N1)
transmission associated with
the Games
This was a detailed
operational description and
surveillance report
The authors stated that no
transmission took place
during the Games; but it is
unclear how the 6 confirmed
cases were infected –
possibly imported cases?
Schenkel
et al. [40]
Infectious disease surveillance
report; World Cup 2006, Germany,
June 9 – July 9, 2006. There was an
extensive enhanced national
surveillance system built around
the event, based on existing
national and local systems
No respiratory events of
public health relevance
were reported. Infection
incidents reported were (a)
single cases of varicella,
mumps, and S.enteritides;
(b) a suspected viral
gastroenteritis outbreak;
and (c) a confirmed
norovirus outbreak
It is not specifically stated
that respiratory infections
were under surveillance,
but the authors stated that
the system was set up ‘‘to
detect adverse health
events of public health
relevance’’ – presumably
including respiratory
infections
Abbreviations used: ARI = acute respiratory tract infection; ILI = influenza-like illness; NPI = non-pharmaceutical interventions;
PCR = polymerase chain reaction; RSV = respiratory syncytial virus; URTI = upper respiratory tract infection.
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were described by their respective authors as
‘‘prospective cohort’’ studies [19,21,22], none of
these five studies included an ‘‘unexposed’’
(non-Hajj attending) control group for comparison,
indicating that they should be more accurately re-
garded as ‘‘before and after’’ studies. Choudhry et
al. [19] assessed Saudi residents (attending the
Hajj from a different part of the country) and
found an incidence of influenza-like illness of about
40%. Three studies of French pilgrims by Gautret et
al. [21,22,26] found rates of cough of between 48%
and 61%; while in El-Bashir and colleagues serolog-
ical study of UK pilgrims [25], respiratory
symptoms occurred in more than 80%, but the sero-
conversion rate was 38% of 115 participants.These variable data underline the difficulties of
comparing different studies that employ contrasting
measures of influenza. Interpretation needs to take
account of the fact that studies using clinical out-
comes suggest much higher levels of influenza-like
conditions than the ones that involve laboratory
confirmation. Even among the laboratory-based
studies, differences in laboratory techniques may
also be significant.
3.3. Outbreak reports
There were four types of outbreaks in the reports
that were reviewed. The first of those was a paper
by Pang et al. [32] that described the experience of
dealing with the SARS (severe acute respiratory
Table 5 Excluded papers. This is a summary list of the 44 articles that were excluded after full text review as they did not
meet the inclusion criteria.
Paper citation Brief notes
Editorials, expert statements, and similar papers
Anonymous. Hajj and 2009 pandemic influenza A H1N1. Lancet 2009;374:1724 Editorial
Anonymous. Human infection with new influenza A (H1N1) virus: WHO
Consultation on suspension of classes and restriction of mass gatherings to
mitigate the impact of epidemics caused by influenza A (H1N1), May 2009.
Wkly Epidemiol Rec 2009;84(27):269–71
WHO technical consultation
report
Dixon B. Mass gathering: mass effect? Lancet Infect Dis 2010;10:662 Expert opinion/reflection
Ebrahim SH, Memish ZA, Uyeki TM, Khoja TA, Marano N, McNabb SJ. Public
health. Pandemic H1N1 and the 2009 Hajj. Science. 2009;13;326(5955):938–
40. Epub 2009 Oct 29
Expert opinion/policy paper
Ferguson N, Nicoll A, Schwartz B. SIP 5: Social distancing during a pandemic.
Not sexy, but sometimes effective: social distancing and non-pharmaceutical
interventions. Vaccine 2009;23;27(45):6383–6
Discussion paper on social
distancing
Franco-Paredes C, Carrasco P, Preciado JI. The first influenza pandemic in the
new millennium: lessons learned hitherto for current control efforts and
overall pandemic preparedness. J Immune Based Ther Vaccines 2009;7:2
Expert commentary
Gatrad AR, Shafi S, Memish ZA, Sheikh A. Hajj and the risk of influenza. BMJ
2006;333:1182–3
Expert opinion
Gautret P, Parola P, Brouqui P. Risk factors for H1N1 influenza complications
in 2009 Hajj pilgrims. Lancet 2010;375:199–200
Letter and opinion
Haworth E, Rashid H, Booy R. Prevention of pandemic influenza after mass
gatherings – learning from Hajj. J R Soc Med 2010;103(3):79–80
Editorial
Memish ZA, Ebrahim SH, Ahmed QA, Deming M, Assiri A (letter). Pandemic
H1N1 influenza at the 2009 Hajj: understanding the unexpectedly low H1N1
burden. J R Soc Med 2010;103:386
Expert commentary
Rashid H, Haworth E, Shafi S, Memish ZA, Booy R. Pandemic influenza: mass
gatherings and mass infection. Lancet Infect Dis. 2008;8(9):526–7. Epub 2008
Aug 4
Expert opinion/reflection
Tomes N. ‘‘Destroyer and teacher’’: Managing the masses during the 1918–
1919 influenza pandemic. Public Health Rep 2010;125 (Suppl. 3):48–62
Discussion paper on the 1918–
1919 influenza pandemic
WHO. Health conditions for travellers to Saudi Arabia for the pilgrimage to
Mecca (Hajj). Wkly Epidemiol Rec 2010;22;85(43):425–8
WHO travel recommendations
Narrative reviews
Ahmed QA, Arabi YM, Memish ZA. Health risks at the Hajj. Lancet
2006;367(9515):1008–15
Narrative review paper
Michael JA, Barbera JA. Mass gathering medical care: a twenty-five year
review. Prehosp Disaster Med 1997;12(4):305–12
Narrative review paper
Milsten AM, Maguire BJ, Bissell RA, Seaman KG. Mass-gathering medical care: a
review of the literature. Prehosp Disaster Med 2002;17(3):151–62
Narrative review paper
Oshitani H. Potential benefits and limitations of various strategies to mitigate
the impact of an influenza pandemic. J Infect Chemother 2006;12(4):167–71
Narrative review paper
World Health Organisation Writing Group. Non-pharmaceutical interventions
for pandemic influenza, national and community measures. Emerging
Infectious Diseases 2006;12:88–94
WHO recommendations on non-
pharmaceutical interventions
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Zielin´ski A. Evidence for excessive incidence of infectious diseases at mass
gatherings with special reference to sporting events. Przegl Epidemiol
2009;63(3):343–51
Narrative review paper
Systematic reviews
Aledort JE, Lurie N, Wasserman J, Bozzette SA. Non-pharmaceutical public
health interventions for pandemic influenza: an evaluation of the evidence
base. BMC Public Health 2007;15(7):208
Systematic review and expert
panel
Jefferson T, Del Mar C, Dooley L, Ferroni E, Al-Ansary LA, Bawazeer GA, et al.
Physical interventions to interrupt or reduce the spread of respiratory viruses:
systematic review. BMJ 2009;21(339):b3675. doi:10.1136/bmj.b3675
Systematic review
Jefferson T, Del Mar C, Dooley L, Ferroni E, Al-Ansary LA, Bawazeer GA, et al.
Physical interventions to interrupt or reduce the spread of respiratory viruses.
Cochrane Database Syst Rev. 2010;2(1):CD006207
Systematic review (Cochrane)
Observational studies
Al-Asmary S, Al-Shehri AS, Abou-Zeid A, Abdel-Fattah M, Hifnawy T, El-Said T.
Acute respiratory tract infections among Hajj medical mission personnel,
Saudi Arabia. Int J Infect Dis 2007;11(3):268–72. Epub 2006 Aug 14
Observational study of the
occupational risk of influenza in
healthcare facility workers at
the Hajj mass gathering
Baum NM, Jacobson PD, Goold SD. ‘‘Listen to the people’’: public deliberation
about social distancing measures in a pandemic. Am J Bioeth 2009;9(11):4–14
Cross-sectional study from
Michigan – focus group
discussions on attitudes towards
social distancing
Broderick MP, Hansen CJ, Russell KL. Exploration of the effectiveness of social
distancing on respiratory pathogen transmission implicates environmental
contributions. J Infect Dis 2008 Nov 15;198(10):1420–6
Non-randomized controlled
social distancing intervention
study in a community setting;
not applicable to a mass
gathering situation
Deris ZZ, Hasan H, Ab. Wahab MS, Sulaiman SA, Naing NN, Othman NH. The
association between pre-morbid conditions and respiratory tract
manifestations amongst Malaysian Hajj pilgrims. Trop Biomed 2010;27:294–
300
This paper presents further data
analysis from an observational
study that is already included in
this review [20]
Eastwood K, Durrheim DN, Butler M. Responses to pandemic (H1N1) 2009,
Australia. A. Emerg Infect Dis 2010;16(8):1211–6
A follow-up cross-sectional
survey on willingness to comply
with potential health
interventions during a
pandemic
Hutton A, Roderick A, Munt R. Lessons learned at World Youth Day: collecting
data and using postcards at mass gatherings. Prehosp Disaster Med
2010;25(3):273–7
Cross-sectional methodological
study on data collection at mass
gatherings
Rubin GJ, Amloˆt R, Page L, Wessely S. Public perceptions, anxiety, and
behaviour change in relation to the swine flu outbreak: cross-sectional
telephone survey. BMJ 2009;2(339):b2651. doi:10.1136/bmj.b2651
Cross-sectional study of swine
flu-related public perceptions
Outbreak report
Witkop CT, Duffy MR, Macias EA, Gibbons TF, Escobar JD, Burwell KN, et al.
Novel Influenza A (H1N1) outbreak at the U.S. Air Force Academy:
epidemiology and viral shedding duration. Am J Prev Med 2010;38(2):121–6.
Epub 2009 Oct 21
Outbreak report from a training
academy
(continued on next page)
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Table 5 (continued)
Paper citation Brief notes
Editorials, expert statements, and similar papers
Historical analyses
Caley P, Philp DJ, McCracken K. Quantifying social distancing arising from
pandemic influenza. J R Soc Interface. 2008 Jun 6;5(23):631–9
Modeling-based historical
outbreak analysis of social
distancing during the 1918–
1919 pandemic
McSweeny K, Colman A, Fancourt N, Parnell M, Stantiall S, Rice G, et al.. Was
rurality protective in the 1918 influenza pandemic in New Zealand? N Z Med J.
2007 Jun 15;120(1256):U2579
Historical analysis of the effect
of residential location on
mortality during the 1918
influenza pandemic
Nishiura H, Chowell G. Household and community transmission of the Asian
influenza A (H2N2) and influenza B viruses in 1957 and 1961. Southeast Asian J
Trop Med Public Health 2007 Nov;38(6):1075–83
Historical outbreak analysis of
community setting transmission
during the 1957 pandemic and
the 1961 epidemic
Wallinga J, van Boven M, Lipsitch M. Optimizing infectious disease
interventions during an emerging epidemic. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA
2010;107(2):923–8. Epub 2009 Dec 28
Vaccine-focused historical
study of interventions during
the 1957–1958 influenza
epidemic
Event surveillance
Coletta M, Dewey L, White-Russell M, Powell T, Toney D, Cheek J, et al.
Surveillance for early detection of disease outbreaks at an outdoor mass
gathering – Virginia, 2005. MMWR Weekly 2006;55:71–74
Brief description and report of
surveillance for a mass
gathering event in Virginia.
Insufficient information
regarding the syndromic
surveillance system used
Giorgi Rossi P, Sangalli M, Faustini A, Forestiere F, Perucci CA. Infectious
diseases in Rome during the Millennium Year. Euro Surveill 2003;8(9):181–5
Brief description and report of
surveillance activities for the
Millennium Year event in Rome.
Respiratory virus infections
were not among the target
diseases for enhanced
surveillance
Gonc¸alves G, Castro L, Correia AM, Queiro´s L. Infectious diseases surveillance
activities in the north of Portugal, during the EURO 2004 football tournament.
Euro Surveill 200;10(4):86–9
Description and report of
surveillance activities for the
Euro 2004 football event in
Portugal. Respiratory virus
infections were not among the
target diseases for enhanced
surveillance
Other types of studies
Avery JG, Chitnis JG, Daly PJ, Pollock GT. Medical planning for a major event:
the Popes visit to Coventry Airport, 30 May 1982. Br Med J (Clin Res Ed). 1982
Jul 3;285(6334):51–3
Operational medical response
to a mass gathering event
Barr AC, Lau RC, Ng NW, da Silva MA, Baptista M, Oliveira VF, et al. What
would you do? Managing a metro network during mass crowd events. J Bus
Contin Emer Plan 2010;4(2):174–80
Operational paper on transport
issues related to mass
gatherings
Fizzell J, Armstrong PK. Blessings in disguise: public health emergency
preparedness for World Youth Day 2008. Med J Aust 2008;189(11–12):633–6
Description of planning and
response to a mass gathering
event
Lo´pez-Cervantes M, Venado A, Moreno A, Pacheco-Domı´nguez RL, Ortega-
Pierres G. On the spread of the novel influenza A (H1N1) virus in Mexico. J
Infect Dev Ctries 2009;3(5):327–30
Background information on the
2009 A(H1N1) outbreak in
Mexico
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Table 5 (continued)
Paper citation Brief notes
Editorials, expert statements, and similar papers
Markel H, Stern AM, Cetron MS, Theodore E. Woodward award: non-
pharmaceutical interventions employed by major American cities during the
1918–1919 influenza pandemic. Trans Am Clin Climatol Assoc 2008;119:129–
38; discussion 138–42
Presentation and discussion
paper on data from the 1918–
1919 influenza pandemic. The
substantial research report
arising from the study was
included in the study [37]
Memish ZA, McNabb SJ, Mahoney F, Alrabiah F, Marano N, Ahmed QA, et al.
Jeddah Hajj Consultancy Group. Establishment of public health security in
Saudi Arabia for the 2009 Hajj in response to pandemic influenza A H1N1.
Lancet 2009;374(9703):1786–91. Epub 2009 Nov 14
Consultation and
recommendations on public
health planning and response
for the Hajj 2009
Poggensee G, Gilsdorf A, Buda S, Eckmanns T, Claus H, Altmann D; RKI Working
Group Pandemic Influenza, Krause G, Haas W. The first wave of pandemic
influenza (H1N1) 2009 in Germany: from initiation to acceleration. BMC Infect
Dis 2010;10:155
Epidemiological description –
initial period of the 2009 H1N1
outbreak in Germany
van Hal SJ, Foo H, Blyth CC, McPhie K, Armstrong P, Sintchenko V, et al.
Influenza outbreak during Sydney World Youth Day 2008: the utility of
laboratory testing and case definitions on mass gathering outbreak
containment. PLoS One 2009;3;4(9):e6620
An analysis of epidemic testing
strategies
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tempted to evaluate the control measures that
were deployed. However, there was no reliable
indication of the impact of mass gathering restric-
tions on controlling the outbreak as mass gather-
ings were grouped together with a number of
measures loosely described as social distancing.
The next group consists of four reports of influ-
enza outbreaks occurring at a religious event in Aus-
tralia and at three large, open-air music festivals in
Europe. All of the events lasted several days and in-
volved crowds ranging from 100,000 to 400,000 peo-
ple. It is particularly relevant that the three music
festivals occurred during the 2009 influenza pan-
demic—two at the beginning and one later during
the pandemic.
The report by Blyth et al. [28] described an out-
break of influenza at a large, 5-day religious event
in Australia during July 2008 attended by over
400,000 participants from 170 countries. Over
100,000 of the pilgrims were accommodated in a
variety of make-shift, overcrowded venues such as
sports halls, community centers and schools. One
hundred laboratory-confirmed cases of influenza
were identified among attendees. Seven different
strains of influenza were identified (four influenza
A and three influenza B), highlighting the potential
for the introduction of novel influenza strains.
Loncarevic et al. [31] described an outbreak of
influenza at a 4-day music festival in Serbia during
July 2009 involving over 190,000 participants, witha number of them coming from other European
countries. Many of the participants stayed at a large
campsite where overcrowding was an issue. Sixty-
two laboratory-confirmed cases of H1N1 (2009)
were identified; some of which were secondary
cases. Although the virus was already present in Ser-
bia at the time of the festival, the sudden increase in
cases, in particular the secondary cases associated
with the festival, suggests possible local spreading.
The authors also reported on a small outbreak of
influenza at an international sporting event held in
Serbia in July over a period of 12 days and attended
by over 500,000 spectators. Seven confirmed cases
of H1N1 (2009) were identified in six athletes and a
volunteer helping at the games. Although a much
larger event, the numbers affected are considerably
smaller and seem to be restricted to participants
rather than those attending.
Gutierrez et al. [30] described a 4-day music fes-
tival in Belgium during early July 2009 attended by
an estimated 120,000 people from all over Europe.
Twelve laboratory-confirmed cases of H1N1 (2009)
were identified. Although sporadic cases of H1N1
(2009) had been detected in Belgium prior to the
festival, an increase in cases was observed after
the event and the decision to shift to mitigation
was taken almost a week after the first festival-
associated cases were identified. The authors
suggest that this festival highlights the potential
seeding role for these events in the early stages
of a pandemic.
Table 6 Papers included in the review, assessed for risk of bias.
Study type Author (reference
number)
Risk of bias Key assessment issues
Quasi-experimental Qureshi [18] High Randomization, blinding and allocation
concealment?
Observational studies: cross-sectional Deris [20] High Relevant control groups?
Laboratory diagnosis?
Appropriate follow-up?
Reliable recruitment format?
Rashid [23] Some
Balkhy [24] Some
Rashid [27] Some
Observational studies: cohorts Choudhry [19] High Unexposed control groups?
Laboratory diagnosis?
Appropriately classified study design?
Gautret [21] High
Gautret [22] High
El Bashir [25] Some
Gautret [26] Some
Outbreak reports Blyth [28] Low Clarity of description of setting and
context?
Use of laboratory diagnosis?
Overall data reliability?
Botelho-Nevers [29] Low
Gutierrez [30] Low
Loncarevic [31] Low
Pang [32] Low
Saenz [33] Low
Zepeda-Lopez [34] Low
Outbreak reports (historical studies) Aimone [35] Some Reliability and multiplicity of data
sources?
In-depth methods description?
Clear outcome measures?
Appropriate analysis?
Breadth of coverage?
Applicability to contemporary setting?
Hatchett [36] Some
Markel [37] Some
Event surveillance reports Demicheli [41] Low Prospectively planned surveillance?
Specific focus on influenza/respiratory
virus?
Clear description of setting and context?
Gundlapalli [38] Low
Lim [39] Low
Schenkel [40] Low
52 D.A. Ishola, N. PhinBotelho-Nevers et al. [29] depict an outbreak of
influenza at a 7-day music festival in Hungary dur-
ing August 2009 attended by 390,000 people from
all over Europe. Many of the participants were lo-
cated on a campsite set up for the festival. Eight
laboratory-confirmed cases of H1N1 (2009) were
identified. Cases of pandemic influenza had already
been identified in Hungary and at the time the
community influenza-like illness rate was 7.8 per
100,000 against an estimated 3.6 per 100,000 at
the music festival.
The third type of outbreak report described by
Saenz et al. [33] involved a large, international
medical conference held in Iran during September
1968 at the early stages of the 1968/1969 pan-
demic. The 7-day conference was attended by over
1000 participants from all over the world. It was
estimated that about a third of the participants
developed an influenza-like illness with an overall
attack rate of 36%. The virus was isolated from
throat and nasal washings; this was found to bethe pandemic A/Hong Kong/68 virus. There was
evidence that close contacts of returning attend-
ees were also affected, but none of the episodes
led to a rapidly expanding focus of infection. The
high attack rate raises the question of whether
the indoor setting may represent a particularly high
risk.
Lastly, there was an innovative study examining
the 2009 A(H1N1) outbreak in Mexico [34]. The
authors described the details of 202 cases and then
used a series of epidemiological tools to map the
spread of the virus throughout the country. They
identified two major contributory factors to the
rapid spread of influenza: one was the very high
population density in parts of Mexico City; the
other was the massive religious festival involving
more than 2 million people, which took place in
the citys Iztapalapa neighbourhood at the very
early stage of the outbreak, shortly before the
new virus was identified. It is suggested by the
authors that this temporal association between
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crease in numbers of cases may reflect participants
returning to their own neighbourhoods across the
city, and from there to other parts of the country.
3.4. Historical outbreak analyses
Inevitably for a subject of research such as mass
gathering restrictions, where prospective studies
present serious practical challenges, researchers
have sought to utilize historical data to try to draw
out major lessons for current impact. This review
included three historical analyses of the non-phar-
maceutical responses to the 1918–1919 influenza
pandemic.
Markel et al. [37] examined the variety of non-
pharmaceutical interventions that were deployed
in 43 American cities during the 1918–1919 influ-
enza pandemic. The combination of school closures
and concurrent public gathering bans was imple-
mented in 34 (79%) of the 43 cities and was the
commonest combination of measures deployed.
Applied early in the pandemic, this combination
was significantly associated with reductions in the
weekly excess death rates. Hatchett et al. [36]
undertook a similar analysis on a smaller number
of American cities where the timing of 19 different
types of non-pharmaceutical interventions was
available. They found that the early application
of multiple interventions showed a trend towards
lower cumulative excess mortality, but that no sin-
gle intervention showed an association with im-
proved aggregate outcomes for the pandemic.
Both studies suggested that for non-pharmaceuti-
cal interventions to be beneficial, they should be
applied early and in a sustained manner.
A further review of the U.S. public health re-
sponse to the 1918 pandemic by Aimone [35] gave
conflicting results. This review examined the public
health response in NewYork City. In NewYork during
the 1918 pandemic, mass gatherings were not pro-
hibited nor were schools closed; instead, the city
opted for a policy of staggered business hours to
avoid rush-hour crowding, enhanced surveillance
so that cases were quickly identified and isolated,
and an intensive program of health education. The
reported outcome measures for New York City were
comparable with those seen in other American cit-
ies, andNewYork City experiencedone of the lowest
excess death rates on the eastern seaboard of the
United States.
3.5. Event surveillance reports
Surveillance reports from four major sporting
events within the last decade were considered suit-able for review [38–41]. The study by Gundlapalli
et al. [38] reported the experience of influenza sur-
veillance during the Winter Olympics at Salt Lake
City in 2002. No indication of the numbers attend-
ing was given, but it is assumed that the numbers
were large. Twenty-eight cases of confirmed influ-
enza from three clusters of influenza-like illness
(ILI) were identified and these were restricted to
either participants in the Games or support staff
for the Games. The clusters consisted of 12 members
of a national team who trained and lived together,
8 participants of a sport and 13 law enforcement
officers who worked and lived in close proximity.
Lim et al. [39] reported on the experience of
managing the Asian Youth Games at Singapore in
June 2009. These games involved over 2000 ath-
letes and officials from 43 countries. Although
numbers of spectators are not given, it is assumed
that the crowds were large. At the start of the
Games, Singapore had already reported 600 con-
firmed cases of H1N1 (2009). Six laboratory-con-
firmed cases of H1N1 (2009) were identified
during the 8 days of the event—four on one football
team. No information on the numbers of confirmed
H1N1 (2009) in the population after the Games was
available.
There was no increase in ILI activity during the
Winter Olympics in Torino in 2006 [41]. The final
study by Schenkel et al. [40] reported on the expe-
rience of syndromic surveillance during the FIFA
World Cup in Germany during June/July 2006. At
the time, Germany was experiencing a very large
outbreak of measles. Measles is essentially spread
by the respiratory route and is highly infectious.
However, despite enhanced daily surveillance, no
outbreaks of respiratory disease or measles associ-
ated with the World Cup were detected.3.6. Systematic review
As stated in Section 2.6, the approach to quality
assessment of the reviewed papers was based on a
pragmatic framework for categorizing studies into
low- or high-risk for bias, depending on the pres-
ence or absence of significant methodological limi-
tations. A high risk of bias was attributed to papers
with at least two significant methodological prob-
lems as identified by the review authors (Table 6).4. Discussion
The evidence to help address important public
health questions around mass gatherings and influ-
enza transmission is sparse, especially in the con-
text of an influenza pandemic. In addition, the
Table 7 Evidence of event characteristics that might influence an association with influenza transmission.
Numbers of
participants
Duration Example of type
of event
Evidence of association
with influenza?
Venue conditions Accommodation
conditions
Comment
Indoors or
outdoor
Crowded?
1000 or more Hours Football matches No – World cup [40] Outdoor Probably not
crowded
Presumed little or no
crowding
Low risk: no cases detected
– outdoor, uncrowded
venues
Theatre,
entertainment
No – however, closures
were associated with
reduction in flu
transmission [36,37]
Indoor Probably
crowded
Presumed no
crowding
Some risk: associated with
influenza despite equivocal
crowding; indoor venues
may be a risk factor
Days Congress Yes – outbreak report
[33]
Indoor Not crowded Presumed no
crowding
100,000 or more Days Music festivals Yes – outbreak reports
[29–31]
Mostly
outdoor
Crowded Crowded High risk: crowded venues
plus crowded
accommodations
Social/religious
festival
Yes – outbreak report
[28,34]
Mostly
outdoor
Crowded Crowded
500,000 or morea Weeks Hajii pilgrimage Yes – observational and
quasiexperimental
studies [18–27]
Both indoor
and outdoor
Crowded Crowded
Major
international
multi-event
tournaments
No/localized – event
surveillance reports
[31,38–41]
Mostly
outdoor
Not crowded Presumed little or no
crowding
Low risk: outdoor,
uncrowded venues seem
ideal
a Major multi-event gatherings like the Olympics were included in this category, even if no specific numbers of participants were given in the reports.
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tigation and there are probably many who may feel
that it is self-evident that mass gatherings facili-
tate the transmission of infectious diseases.
This systematic search of the literature identi-
fied a limited number of studies that addressed
the review questions regarding whether mass gath-
erings are associated with influenza transmission
and whether restricting mass gatherings reduces
the spread of influenza within the community.
4.1. What is a mass gathering?
In attempting to understand and describe a situa-
tion or intervention, a common understanding or
definition is essential. There is currently no gener-
ally accepted definition of what constitutes a mass
gathering. However, the literature on mass gather-
ing medical care highlights an emerging consensus
amongst those providing emergency medical care
at organized events. In this setting, mass gather-
ings are considered to be organized events with
more than 1000 people in attendance [4–6]. A re-
cently published guidance document from the
World Health Organisation (WHO) expanded the
term to cover any organized or unplanned event
involving enough people to ‘‘strain the planning
and response resources of the (host) community,
State or nation’’ [42].
The major limitation in trying to define mass
gatherings is that any single definition would inev-
itably be too simplistic as it would need to incorpo-
rate events as diverse as the Hajj (lasting about
1 month and involving between 2 and 3 million peo-
ple), and a football match (involving several thou-
sand spectators over a period of about 2 h).
A system for classifying mass gatherings on the
basis of size and duration is lacking and may be
required.
4.2. What does the evidence say about mass
gatherings and the risk of influenza
transmission?
In recognition of the difficulties of conducting
hypothesis-based studies that directly implement
and assess the effects of restrictions of mass gath-
erings in real life, an indirect approach was taken
to address the review questions as follows:
4.2.1. Are mass gatherings associated with
influenza transmission?
To address whether mass gatherings are associated
with influenza transmission, evidence was derived
from the following:- A quasi-experimental study that was primarily
designed to quantify vaccine efficacy in the form of
a non-randomized trial.
- Observational studies that assessed participants
before and after exposure to mass gathering events.
- Reports of influenza outbreaks and other respiratory
illnesses at mass gathering events.
- Communicable disease surveillance reports from
some major events.
A number of studies [18–22] have consistently
demonstrated, over a number of years, that respira-
tory virus transmission occurs amongst pilgrims
attending the annual Hajj in Saudi Arabia, and it is
recognized as an issue of international public health
significance [43–46] that could be particularly
important in a pandemic situation. A significant pro-
portion of pilgrims are affected by symptoms of
either an influenza-like illness or an acute respira-
tory illness with the proportion affected reaching
about 40% in some studies [19,20]. The Hajj is, how-
ever, a unique event with almost 3 million people
converging on a relatively small geographic area
for a period of at least 5 days, extending up to
4 weeks. Crowd density is very high and overcrowd-
ing in the living accommodation is common. Given
the unusual nature of this event, the applicability
of these findings to other mass gatherings is there-
fore limited. There is also a question regarding the
fact that several of these studies are based on clini-
cal criteria that could be due to other viral respira-
tory illnesses besides influenza.
In a small number of outbreak studies involving
influenza-like illness and confirmed influenza at
large music festivals, there is varying evidence
about the extent to which influenza transmission
occurs. Outbreaks were based on laboratory
diagnosis, and transmission was confirmed in all,
though they had varying infection rates ranging
from roughly 3 to 25 per 100,000. Two recent stud-
ies undertaken during the 2009 pandemic suggest
that at the beginning of a pandemic, these gather-
ings may act as seeding events [30]; indeed it has
been suggested at the early stages of the 1999 pan-
demic A(H1N1), a huge Easter season mass gather-
ing involving 2 million people may have helped in
propelling the first wave of the outbreak through-
out Mexico [34].
There is no compelling evidence from event sur-
veillance reports, such as international athletic
events, the World Cup and the Winter Olympics,
to indicate that these major events significantly in-
crease community transmission of influenza. Out-
breaks did occur in some cases, but these always
seemed restricted to the actual competitors and
staff rather than the crowds attending or the wider
community.
56 D.A. Ishola, N. PhinTogether, all of these reports point to the po-
tential for influenza outbreak and transmission in
connection with large, multiple-day, open-air
events. Thus there is some evidence to indicate
that mass gatherings may be associated with an in-
creased risk of influenza transmission, but it seems
to be very variable.4.2.2. Does the type of mass gathering
influence the association with influenza
transmission?
The type of mass gathering event seems to be of
considerable importance in terms of the risk of
influenza transmission (Table 7). Most of the evi-
dence supporting the role of mass gatherings in
the transmission of influenza comes from events
where there are crowds with high crowd densities
(which may be theoretically estimated at >5 people
per square metre), and where the participants are
likely to live close together for prolonged periods,
e.g. the Hajj pilgrimage [18–22] and large musical
festivals [28–30]. In these events, accommoda-
tions which are already likely crowded are also
likely to be relatively basic, such as communal
camp-style living, with the probable risk of sub-
optimal hygiene facilities. It seems apparent that
events where close contact among participants ex-
tends beyond event venues and into accommodation
areas are most associated with influenza. Event size,
per se, does not seem to be a critical factor.
In contrast, there is no convincing evidence that
major organized sporting events are associated
with significantly increased influenza transmission
in those attending the event [38–40]. An important
example of this contrast comes from Serbia, where
two major events of different type and scale hap-
pened to coincide in 2009, providing a ‘‘natural
experimental’’ opportunity for comparison [31]. In
the larger event, only four event-linked confirmed
influenza cases occurred at the World University
Games held over a 12-day period and involving al-
most 25,000 athletes and staff with about 500,000
spectators. However, in a relatively smaller event
held in the same month and within the same coun-
try, as many as 47 event-linked confirmed cases oc-
curred at a 4-day music festival with around
190,000 participants.
Furthermore, in surveillance reports from re-
cent major international sports competitions,
cases or small clusters of influenza were reported,
but these were mainly among the event partici-
pants rather than among the overall population of
people exposed to the events [38,39]. This was true
even for one major event that took place within a
pandemic context [39]. These events showed noclear evidence of influenza transmission, indicating
that influenza may not be a significant cause for
concern at modern world sports events. This view
is supported by the surveillance report from the
2006 World Cup in Germany [40], where instances
of transmission were not reported, meaning that
they were either not detected or very low.
This situation may in part be explained by the
brief transitory nature of contact in the crowds in
highly organized international sports festivals such
as the Olympics and the World Cup, which are usu-
ally seated events with good spacing in-between
seats and mostly in open-air settings with dilution
of any infectious droplets that may be generated.
The apparently low or absent influenza transmis-
sion at such events may also reflect the contempo-
rary fact that many people who attend major
sports championships tend to have planned their
visit a long time ahead, as ticket sales usually start
months or even years in advance. Spectators as
well as participants tend to stay in more conven-
tional accommodations such as hotels rather than
tents or other forms of portable or camp-style
quarters with highly crowded conditions. It is also
important to note that contemporary major events
are now deploying increasingly developed systems
for infectious disease surveillance and control
[47], which are crucial for early detection and con-
tainment where possible.
The other situation of note relates to indoor
events such as large conferences, typified by the
international medical conference held over 7 days
in Iran during the early stages of the 1968/1969
pandemic [33]. During this meeting it was esti-
mated that about a third of the participants devel-
oped an influenza-like illness with an overall attack
rate of 36%; the pandemic virus was isolated from
those cases where testing had been undertaken.
This potentially highlights the role that ventilation
may play in the reduction of influenza transmission
and is another factor worthy of consideration.
In summary, the type of mass gathering event
seems to influence the risk of influenza transmis-
sion, key factors being the degree of crowdedness,
the event duration and, possibly, whether the
event is held indoors or outdoors. Multiple-day
events with crowded communal accommodations
may be the links to mass gatherings most associ-
ated with influenza.
4.2.3. Can influenza transmission be
reduced by restriction of mass gatherings?
To address whether mass gathering restrictions can
reduce influenza transmission, the mainly relevant
papers found were archival studies of the 1918–
1919 influenza pandemic [35–37] and an analysis
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domized controlled trials were found, reflecting
the practical difficulties that such studies would
involve.
Mass gatherings of varying dimensions were re-
stricted at a large number of American cities during
the 1918–1919 period. The reports again high-
lighted the difficulty of interpreting what was
meant by a mass gathering, e.g. including schools,
cinemas, theatres and other public places. In gen-
eral, evidence suggests that these measures had a
beneficial effect, especially where implemented
early in the course of the outbreak [36,37]. How-
ever, these benefits were not universal across all
the cities [35].
Restrictions were typically implemented as part
of a set of interventions, e.g. combining quaran-
tine and isolation policies with banning mass gath-
erings. As a result, it is extremely difficult to tease
out the individual effects of mass gathering restric-
tions alone. Using multivariate techniques, investi-
gators attempted to isolate the differential effects
of individual restriction measures and found indica-
tions that certain interventions (such as closures of
entertainment venues) had measurable specific im-
pact [36,37], but this evidence is limited.
An analysis of the 2003 SARS outbreak in China
attempted to probe the impact of mass gathering
restrictions that were applied in a contemporary
setting [32]. However, as with the historical stud-
ies, it was not possible to distinguish the specific
effects of mass gathering restrictions from
amongst the broad range of other public health
interventions that were applied.
In summary, there is some evidence that when
applied early and in tandem with other public
health measures, such as isolation and quarantine
and closures of educational institutions, mass gath-
ering restrictions may help in reducing transmis-
sion. In a pandemic like that experienced during
2009, it is unlikely that the measures described
above could be justified; however, in a much more
severe pandemic, the cost–benefit equation could
easily shift the other way. The application of bans
on mass gatherings and other related public health
measures are therefore highly dependent on an
early indication of the severity as measured by its
impact on individuals and society.
4.3. Practical implications of the findings of
the review
There are two further, critical domains of uncer-
tainty that need to be considered in the develop-
ment of evidence-based guidance and policies
regarding mass gatherings. The first domain relatesto issues around the current understanding about
how influenza is spread, and factors that can affect
transmissibility (e.g. host factors, pathogen fac-
tors, environmental factors and particle size) [9].
Key questions remain in these areas, which may
be important in making specific recommendations
regarding particular types and scope of mass gath-
ering restrictions.
The second domain impinging on the potential
effectiveness of any public policy on mass gather-
ings includes the whole range of factors affecting
adherence and compliance. For instance, the expe-
rience of the 2009 pandemic has raised significant
questions around how willing people might be to
comply with bans imposed on mass gathering
restrictions [48–51]. Other challenging issues in-
clude the problematic ethical and legal frame-
works for implementing restrictions for public
health purposes [52,53], as well as considerable
logistical and economic implications. If long-
planned events were to be cancelled, who would
be liable for the huge personal, corporate and na-
tional costs that such cancellations might incur?
In considering policy recommendations within a
pandemic context, the most practical approach
for all but the more severe pandemics may be a
strategy of encouraging voluntary restrictions. This
would involve giving the public the best available
information and advising rather than legislating
that organizations and individuals avoid non-essen-
tial events where there is at least some evidence of
transmission risk. For such a strategy to have a
chance of succeeding, it would be most important
to have in place a carefully and sensitively pre-
pared communication strategy, since recommen-
dations to avoid public gatherings are likely to
run against powerful social pressures to do other-
wise [54]. The success of any public health strat-
egy—and this must be particularly true in relation
to a potential or imminent pandemic situation—re-
quires the building of trust [55] and an intelligent
and purposeful engagement of the public even
prior to the event [56].
There are other important issues to note.
Although this review has focused on mass gather-
ings, limiting transmission of influenza clearly
requires a multifaceted approach. Some studies in
this review reflected such an approach; for exam-
ple, in the historical outbreak investigations where
restrictions on mass gatherings were combined with
other non-pharmaceutical measures [32,36,37]. It
would be prudent to apply the best evidence relating
to other social distancing interventions in conjunc-
tion with any specific policies on mass gatherings.
An additional question that should be considered
is whether non-pharmaceutical health interven-
58 D.A. Ishola, N. Phintions such as mass gathering restrictions, actually
reduce the health burden of influenza, or only mod-
ify the epidemiology by temporarily delaying the
eventual impact of an event such as a pandemic.
It is tempting to speculate on the possibility of a
reduction in disease burden; historically, some of
the American cities that implemented mass gather-
ing restrictions during the 1918–1919 pandemic
seemed to achieve significant reductions in peak
morbidity andmortality that may well have reduced
the overall burden. However, pragmatically, coun-
tries like the United Kingdom aim to achieve a
slower spread, to prolong the troughs and to flatten
the peaks of the epidemic curves to buy time for
countermeasures to take effect and to enable ser-
vices to cope with a lower volume of activity.
In this context, the most important point to
emphasize is that mass gathering restrictions must
only be a part of a range of interventions. The syn-
ergistic effects of multiple interventions is what
would allow the best chance to achieve significant
reductions in overall burden.
4.4. The need for further evidence
More evidence is needed on this subject. There is a
need for well-designed studies to more accurately
quantify the nature of the infections causing flu-like
symptoms at mass gatherings, confirm the key
parameters that influence the transmission of influ-
enza in these settings, and to directly assess the im-
pact of mass gathering restrictions. But as ‘‘gold
standard’’ randomized comparison designs are ex-
tremely difficult to apply to this kind of interven-
tion, attention needs to focus on optimal
observational study options. From a UK perspec-
tive, British people travelling abroad for mass gath-
erings such as the Hajj or other large events could
be approached for inclusion in prospective studies
for comparison with appropriately matched, non-
travelling controls, with care being taken to avoid
drawbacks observed in existing studies. Within the
UK, mass gatherings ranging from indoor events in
theatres and cinemas, to outdoor events such as
football matches and major musical events like
the Glastonbury festival or Travellers horse fairs
represent potential opportunities for carefully
designed prospective cohort studies to be under-
taken. The biggest issue is persuading funders that
given the current paucity of good studies, such fur-
ther research is still needed.
4.5. Strengths and weaknesses of the review
As previously noted, this review has examined an
intervention area in which there are a limited num-ber of relevant studies and there is limited com-
mon understanding of what constitutes a mass
gathering. Despite these challenges, it has been
possible to extract limited strands of evidence that
may be useful towards policy development. Also,
within the boundaries of the inclusion criteria,
and despite the limited work timescale, this review
was able to capture all the relevant studies identi-
fied by recent systematic reviews investigating
non-pharmaceutical interventions designed to limit
transmission of influenza and/or other respiratory
viral infections [7,8,57].
However, due to time constraints in carrying out
this work, as described in Section 2.5, while every
effort has been made to be as comprehensive as
possible, it is acknowledged that the rapid evi-
dence assessment process necessarily involved
some limitations. The literature search is not nec-
essarily exhaustive and there is therefore a possi-
bility of incomplete retrieval of all potentially
relevant studies.
While a range of study designs were reviewed,
there was not a single randomized controlled trial
that was suitable for inclusion. This is of course
not surprising, given the formidable logistical, cost
and ethical hurdles that make large-scale experi-
mental epidemiological studies of the restriction
of mass gatherings impractical and probably impos-
sible. Some of the included studies had significant
design and quality issues as duly reflected in the
individual paper summaries and the discussion,
and highlighted in Tables 4 and 6.
A common issue with a number of the studies in-
cluded in the review is that they depended on clin-
ical symptoms like cough or syndromes such as
influenza-like illness, rather than laboratory diag-
nosis of influenza. In such studies it is not possible
to isolate the impact of influenza as opposed to
other respiratory viruses, and the risk of influenza
could potentially be over-interpreted. In the stud-
ies where laboratory testing was undertaken, influ-
enza was only confirmed in minority proportions of
people with respiratory symptoms, ranging be-
tween 6% and 14% [23,24,27], but possibly up to a
roughly estimated 40% in one study [25].
This review did not include specific ‘‘special-
ized’’ settings that may arguably be regarded as
mass gatherings, such as groups of people travel-
ling for periods of time on cruise ships. The authors
took the view that any transit-related settings
would be best considered under a separate evi-
dence review of influenza transmission through
transportation. Modelling studies were also ex-
cluded, and it is acknowledged that their inclusion
may offer an additional dimension in order to build
a fuller picture.
Could influenza transmission be reduced by restricting mass gatherings? 59The application of quantitative techniques could
have potentially enhanced the simple narrative ap-
proach that was adopted for the analysis. However,
there are insufficient studies presenting quantita-
tive data on this subject, and moreover, there is
a high level of heterogeneity amongst the identi-
fied studies.5. Conclusion
In conclusion, there are limited data indicating
that mass gatherings are associated with influenza
transmission. Some evidence suggests that restrict-
ing mass gatherings together with other social dis-
tancing measures may help to reduce transmission.
However, the evidence is not strong enough to
advocate legislation or proscription. Therefore, in
a pandemic situation a cautious policy of voluntary
avoidance of mass gatherings would be prudent.
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